Freedom of the Will

Table of Contents

The Problem of Free Will

The question of free will emerged from Christian theology rather than ancient Greek philosophy. The Greeks had little concept of what we now call “free will” - this arose later from systematic theological debates about divine foreknowledge and human responsibility.

The central distinction lies between what you do and what merely happens to you. This seemingly simple difference raises profound questions about the nature of human action and moral responsibility.

Two fundamental doctrines frame the debate:

• Determinism: Everything that happens was determined to happen by prior causes. This idea traces back to St. Augustine’s City of God and suggests that every event, including human actions, follows inevitably from what came before.

• Free Will: Humans possess genuine freedom in their choices and decisions. If determinism is true, then everything we do is the effect of some prior cause, seemingly eliminating real choice.

This creates two main philosophical positions:

• Incompatibilism: Free will and determinism cannot both be true
• Compatibilism: Free will remains possible even in a deterministic universe

Chisholm’s Incompatibilist Response

Chisholm argues that genuine choice requires what he calls “immanent causation” - a special kind of causation where agents themselves, rather than prior events, cause their actions. Desires and motives can “incline” us toward certain choices without “necessitating” them.

The challenge for incompatibilists is explaining how genuine choice is possible. If we decide based on reasons, and those reasons determine our choice, then our decision seems deterministic. Chisholm’s solution involves uncaused causes - the idea that our intentions to act aren’t themselves caused by our desires and motives in the ordinary causal sense.

Hume’s Compatibilist Gambit

Hume attempts to reconcile free will with determinism through a clever redefinition. According to his “gambit”:

• An act is free when one does what one wants to do
• One’s will is free when one would have done otherwise if one had desired otherwise
• Crucially, it doesn’t matter whether one’s desires were themselves predetermined

This view allows for free action even in a fully deterministic world. As long as our actions flow from our own desires, we act freely - regardless of what originally caused those desires.

The challenge for compatibilists like Hume is explaining how we can truly decide between options if our decisions were causally predetermined from the beginning of time.

Frankfurt’s Hierarchical Theory

Harry Frankfurt offers a sophisticated compatibilist account that doesn’t depend on whether determinism is true or false. His theory focuses on the psychological structure of the will rather than metaphysical questions about causation.

The Structure of Desire

Frankfurt distinguishes between different levels of desire:

• First-order desires: immediate wants and impulses
• Second-order desires: desires about which first-order desires should be effective
• Second-order volitions: when you want a certain desire to become your will

What makes someone a person, rather than merely a sophisticated animal, is having second-order desires - the capacity to step back and evaluate one’s own motivational states.

Free Acts vs. Free Will

Frankfurt draws a crucial distinction:

• A free act is simply doing what you want (even animals can do this)
• Free will is being able to will what you want to will

This leads to several important character types:

The wanton only follows their strongest first-order desire without any reflective evaluation. They lack free will entirely because they never form second-order volitions about their desires.

The ordinary person adjudicates between competing first-order desires through second-order volitions. When their second-order volitions are effective, they possess both free will and perform free acts.

The unwilling addict forms second-order volitions (they want to overcome their addiction) but systematically fails to implement them. They have free will but don’t act freely.

The willing addict endorses their first-order desire for drugs. While they may be responsible for their actions, Frankfurt suggests they lack true freedom because their endorsement isn’t genuinely their own.

Frankfurt’s account explains why freedom of will seems distinctively human and grounds moral responsibility in higher-order psychological structures rather than metaphysical claims about causation.

Watson’s Value-Based Critique

Gary Watson builds on Frankfurt’s insights while addressing a key weakness: if the world is predetermined, then our higher-order desires are also predetermined. How can they be genuinely “ours”?

Values vs. Desires

Watson distinguishes between wanting and valuing. Drawing on ancient philosophical psychology, he separates:

• The rational part (reason): identifies what is valuable and provides principles for living well
• The appetitive part (passion/desire): governs the strength of our motivational impulses

Unlike Hume, who saw reason as merely calculating probabilities while desires drive action, Watson follows the ancient view that values can provide genuine reasons for action while desires can be completely arational.

The Problem of Free Action

Unfree action occurs when an agent cannot achieve what they most value due to conflicts within their motivational system. Two main types of conflict threaten freedom:

1. Desiring things we don’t value at all (addictions, compulsions, misplaced passions)
2. Having desires whose strength doesn’t match the value of their objects (obsessing over fame, wealth, or appearance)

Watson argues that what makes a volition genuinely “yours” isn’t its place in a hierarchy of desires, but its relationship to your evaluational system - your judgments about what constitutes a good life.

Values define our standpoint, the perspective from which we judge the world and our place in it. When our motivational system drives us contrary to our evaluational system, we fail to be free agents.

Zhuangzi’s Alternative Vision

The Chinese philosopher Zhuangzi approaches questions of agency from a radically different angle, without relying on Western concepts of choice or will.

The Woodworker’s Wisdom

Zhuangzi tells the story of Qing, a master woodworker who creates a bell stand so perfect that people think it must be the work of spirits. When asked about his method, Qing explains:

He fasts and clears his mind of all desire for reward, honor, skill, or reputation. In this stillness, he becomes one with the trees in the forest and sees the bell stand already present in the wood. He acts only when perfect harmony exists between himself and the natural situation.

This contrasts sharply with Western philosophers who emphasize desire as the basis of freedom. Zhuangzi emphasizes quieting desire altogether.

Harmony Over Control

Rather than focusing on “could have done otherwise” or control over one’s psychological states, Zhuangzi emphasizes:

• Harmony with the world rather than control over oneself
• Responsiveness to situations rather than imposing one’s will
• Flexibility and openness to multiple ways of doing things
• Becoming and transformation rather than fixed identity

For Zhuangzi, freedom emerges from harmony between self and situation, not from any internal psychological structure. The self is responsive to circumstances, practicing what he calls “non-control.”

This raises profound questions about moral responsibility. Traditional Western views ground responsibility in acting from one’s own free will. Zhuangzi’s alternative suggests responsibility comes from natural responsiveness and trust in the unfolding of situations rather than from will or control.

Whether this Eastern conception provides sufficient grounds for moral responsibility remains an open question, but it offers a genuinely different way of thinking about human agency that sidesteps many traditional Western philosophical problems.